On December 16, 2025, the Alberta Court of Appeal released its decision in Wirring v Law Society of Alberta. The Court unanimously affirmed that the Charter protects lawyers from being forced to “choose between following [their] religious convictions or practicing law”, and that state action compelling such a “choice” represents “a clear and significant infringement” of religious freedom (para 94). The Court emphasized that, while such infringements may still be justified under the Charter, the government bears the burden of establishing why. Specifically, when the government imposes professional obligations that override a lawyers’ sincere religious commitments, it must demonstrate that such requirements “have a pressing and substantial objective and the means chosen must be proportional to that objective” (para 97).
Christian Legal Fellowship (CLF) intervened in the appeal, and welcomes the Court’s strong affirmation of an important principle: that the Charter’s religious freedom guarantee is clearly engaged where the state imposes requirements that violate a lawyer’s religious commitments and interferes with their ability to live by their religious beliefs. As section 1 of the Charter makes clear, the government must demonstrably justify why such requirements are reasonable in a free and democratic society.
Background
The appeal examined the constitutionality of the Oath of Allegiance required of candidates for admission to the Alberta bar. The claimant, Mr. Wirring, was an otherwise eligible candidate but, as an Amritdhari Sikh, could not swear an oath of allegiance to a person or entity other than the Creator in the Sikh tradition.
The decision under appeal ruled that, despite Mr. Wirring’s understanding of the oath’s literal wording (“I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King Charles the Third, his heirs and successors, according to law”), the ‘correct’ meaning of the oath was a “symbolic commitment” to uphold the rule of law, and not a literal oath of allegiance to a person. As such, the lower Court concluded that the oath did not “objectively” interfere with Mr. Wirring’s conscientious beliefs, because he misunderstood its true meaning, and that s. 2(a) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of religion and conscience, was not engaged. As a result, the government was not required to do anything further to justify the Oath as a professional obligation.
While CLF did not take a position on the outcome of the case, it intervened at the Court of Appeal to help clarify the legal test for analyzing a religious freedom claim. CLF was particularly concerned by the prospect that a religious claim could be dismissed based on a court’s disagreement with a claimant’s spiritual understanding of an oath and how it binds his own conscience. As CLF’s factum explained:
[Canadian law] considers an oath as having extraordinary significance and a solemn commitment to profess the truth. The oath remains different in kind, and in law, from any other statement or expression a person makes: it represents “a method of binding” or “getting a hold on the conscience” of the person who swears it. […] It is precisely because of the inviolable nature of the oath, and its profound relationship with truth-telling and one’s conscience, that makes it inappropriate for the s. 2(a) framework to superimpose the state’s interpretation of its content or meaning on a claimant who has a different understanding of its truth – or untruth.
The appeal therefore highlighted a challenging tension in Canadian constitutional doctrine. On the one hand, courts are required to objectively assess whether state action infringes on a claimant’s religious freedom. On the other hand, the ways in which certain state requirements implicate a claimant’s inner conscience are intrinsically subjective (such as a personal oath). How, then, should courts “objectively” assess whether a claimant’s conscience has been violated, contrary to the Charter’s guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion in s. 2(a)?
CLF argued that, while the religious freedom infringement test rightly requires an “objective” analysis, it must still be assessed in the context of the claimant’s specific beliefs and with reference to his or her specific concerns.
Court of Appeal’s decision
Although the Court of Appeal did not address all of CLF’s submissions, a number of them were reflected in its decision. For example, the Court ruled that an objective analysis of the Oath of Allegiance must examine not only whether it is personally “addressed to the Queen” but whether it ultimately “involves making a commitment that has priority over, or overrides, the oath-taker’s religious and personal commitments” (para 70). This second part of the analysis was missing in the decision below and essentially corresponds to CLF’s doctrinal submissions on appeal (although the Court’s analysis differed from CLF’s proposed framework, as discussed further below).
The Court of Appeal found that the Oath of Allegiance requires an overriding commitment to ideals that the Court described as “supersed[ing] the taker’s personal and religious commitments”. Because Mr. Wirring “believed that his religion prohibited him from making such a commitment”, the Court concluded that “the requirement to take the Oath of Allegiance interfered with his ability to live by his religious beliefs” (para 92).
The burden then shifted to the government to establish why the Oath was demonstrably justified as a reasonable limit on freedom of religion in a free and democratic society. CLF did not intervene on this question, and did not suggest that the Oath could not be justified on this basis. Rather, CLF acknowledged:
[F]or many in the legal profession, the Oath of Allegiance is itself an important expression of their commitment to act with integrity. It represents a cherished recognition that lawyers serve a cause higher than themselves and are accountable to promoting the common good and acting in the public interest. For many lawyers, it symbolizes a profound commitment to their country, their fellow citizens, the cause of justice, and the rule of law. But ultimately, an oath is precisely that: the personal commitment of each person who swears it. What its wording means for conscientious purposes is a question of individual internalization and interpretation, and the fact that many interpret its meaning one way does not mean that every licensee does – or can – particularly when its “plain meaning” may pull them in a different direction. […]
Nothing in these submissions necessarily requires that an oath – or any other act, rule, or activity – be constitutionally invalidated. The government must still have the opportunity to demonstrate whether such requirements are justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter. CLF’s position is simply that, where a claimant advances a reasonable explanation as to how state action seriously interferes with their religion or conscience, the government should be required to establish why such interference is demonstrably justified and cannot be accommodated.
The Court of Appeal’s analysis reflected this approach, turning to the government to justify the Oath requirement, but finding that this test was not met as the government “tendered no evidence to support its position that the infringement is justified” (para 98). As such, the Court concluded that the Oath of Allegiance is unconstitutional, and of no force or effect.
However, the Court noted that lawyers in Alberta are “still required to take the Law Society Oath, which includes a commitment to practice law in the public interest (among other things), and the Official Oath, which includes a commitment to be diligent and practice to the best of the candidate’s ability” (para 115). Neither of these oaths were challenged in the appeal.
Key Takeaways
Ultimately, the Court concluded that professional obligations that interfere with a lawyer’s religious beliefs engage the Charter’s protection, and require demonstrable justification.
In this specific case, the Court found that the Oath required priority over the claimant’s religious convictions because of the words “to be faithful and bear true allegiance” (para 95, emphasis in original). In the Court’s view, this language involves making an “overriding commitment” with “special stringency” that “supersedes” the oath-taker’s personal and religious commitments (paras 71, 92).
This analysis has drawn some criticism, and one may agree or disagree as to whether that is actually what those words mean. Would all lawyers who took the Oath of Allegiance share the Court’s view that it is “a strict type of commitment or devotion that has priority over any other commitments including religious ones” (paras 11-12)? It is one thing to acknowledge that this understanding of the Oath was sincerely held and reasonably arrived at by a claimant; it is another to declare that this is the objectively correct meaning of the Oath for all who take it. Cases could be resolved through the former approach, without insisting on the latter, and this was precisely the point of CLF’s intervention. As CLF explained:
[T]here is a significant difference between the legal meaning of a legislative text and the spiritual meaning of a personal expression or activity that the legal text requires – such as an oath. An oath is not a legal ordinance capable of a strictly “correct” or “incorrect” interpretation in this context. Rather, it is deeply personal and its meaning – including how it binds the conscience of the oath-taker – is inherently subjective...
The analysis would be different if a court were interpreting a legislative provision that stated, for example: “All lawyers owe a duty to the Crown, and thereby must practice law in a manner upholding the rule of law and Canada’s constitutional democracy.” Then the court would be interpreting a statutory requirement, and the court has the constitutional mandate and authority to determine what a statute does (and does not) require in the context of its legal obligations, application, and enforcement. With such a statute, there can be one, legally “correct” interpretation. But this is not always true for state-mandated expressions or actions – including oaths – whose meanings can be susceptible to multiple, reasonable interpretations. There is no rule of statutory interpretation that can “correctly” determine the nature of such an activity’s inner meaning or conscientious obligations for a claimant.
For these reasons, to the extent that the Court’s decision suggests that a legally ‘correct’ meaning of an oath can and must be interpreted ‘objectively’ by courts in accordance with the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation for s. 2(a) purposes, CLF’s concerns remain. However, the decision does otherwise contain helpful clarification on examining how professional obligations engage a lawyer’s religious convictions, and requiring the government to demonstrably justify any requirements which compel lawyers to act contrary to their conscientious beliefs.
Members of CLF’s community may not hold the same religious or conscientious position as the claimant in this case, but as explained in our intervention, we share a deep commitment to practicing law as integrated religious professionals in fidelity to our core beliefs. The issues raised in this appeal engage such commitments and this decision helpfully clarifies that there are limits on the extent to which a lawyer’s religious beliefs can be restricted by a state regulator.
READ MORE:
Read about CLF’s intervention in this appeal.
Read the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in this appeal.
Read the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision granting leave to CLF to intervene in Wirring v Law Society of Alberta.
Read CLF’s Factum, filed with the Alberta Court of Appeal on June 28, 2024.