BILL 21 RULING
The Quebec Superior Court has largely upheld Bill 21 as constitutional. While a disappointing outcome, Derek Ross writes, the decision affirms a number of important principles for religious freedom and equality.
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[A]ll these people who aspire to assume one of these positions are faced with the following dilemma: either they act in accordance with their soul and conscience, in this case their beliefs, or they work in their chosen profession. One can easily understand that this is a cruel consequence which dehumanizes the individuals concerned.”
On April 20, Justice Marc-André Blanchard of the Quebec Superior Court released his much-anticipated decision addressing the constitutionality of Quebec’s Bill 21.
The controversial Bill – which seeks to promote the “laïcité” of the state by, among other measures, banning religious symbols for certain public professions – had been challenged by a number of religious individuals and civil rights organizations. Ordinarily, the law would be subject to challenge under the Charter’s guarantees of religious freedom (s. 2) and religious equality (s. 15). However, the Quebec government invoked s. 33 of the Charter, which allows a law to operate even if it breaches those protections (the “Notwithstanding Clause”).
As a result, the Court ruled, the law is not unconstitutional – at least, not entirely. The law was largely upheld, but certain provisions were struck down to the extent that they apply to (1) members of Quebec’s National Assembly and (2) employees of English school boards. This is because, in those specific contexts, Bill 21’s impugned provisions violate s. 3 (democratic rights) and s. 23 of the Charter (minority language educational rights), respectively. Those sections of the Charter are not subject to s. 33’s Notwithstanding Clause, and, thus, the constitutional challenge was successful – but only on those discrete grounds.
Christian Legal Fellowship (CLF) has long expressed opposition to Bill 21. As an association of religious legal professionals, CLF is especially concerned about the Bill’s specific application to lawyers who work for the government or in other public sector roles. As CLF has explained, those provisions effectively ban openly religious lawyers from public service. Indeed, one of the plaintiffs in the Bill 21 litigation is a practicing Muslim who is unable to practice as a criminal prosecutor under the law (para 64). The same is true for Nour Farhat, a Muslim lawyer in private practice who represents one of the plaintiffs and who has been forced to “choose” between freely expressing her religious identity and her dream of working as a prosecutor.
Although the Court’s decision does not offer a remedy for these lawyers – or the many other Quebec employees affected by the law – it does contain some important findings. Specifically, the Court rejected the notion that one could easily remove their religious symbols while at the workplace. Forcing someone to separate themselves from their religious identity in this way is “insensitive and morally repugnant” (para 66, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Amselem). As the court explained:
Original judgment
Unofficial translation
[65] Cette exclusion de la simple possibilité d’exercer la carrière envisagée, pour laquelle on possède toutes les qualifications, représente plus qu’un simple déni d’une chance, car elle transmet le message que les personnes qui exercent leur foi ne méritent pas de participer à part entière dans la société québécoise. […]
[65] This exclusion from the mere possibility of pursuing one’s intended career, for which one has all the qualifications, is more than a simple denial of an opportunity, as it sends the message that people who practice their faith do not deserve to participate fully in Quebec society. […]
[69] D’autre part, toutes ces personnes qui aspirent à occuper l’un de ces emplois se trouvent placées devant le dilemme suivant : ou bien elles agissent en fonction de leur âme et conscience, en l’occurrence leurs croyances, ou bien elles travaillent dans le métier de leur choix. On peut aisément comprendre qu’il s’agit là d’une conséquence cruelle qui déshumanise les personnes visées.
[70] Pour plusieurs, le législateur envoie le message explicite que leur foi et la façon qu’ils la pratiquent n’importent pas et qu’elle n’emporte pas la même dignité ni ne requiert la même protection de la part de l’État. Pour eux, la Loi 21 postule qu’il existe quelque chose de fondamentalement mal ou nocif avec les pratiques religieuses, particulièrement certaines d’entre elles, et que l’on doit prémunir le public. Ainsi, elle transmet un message explicitement exclusif à l’égard des personnes qui se font dire qu’elles ne peuvent participer pleinement dans les institutions publiques de l’État seulement à cause de leurs convictions intimes.
[69] On the other hand, all these people who aspire to assume one of these positions are faced with the following dilemma: either they act in accordance with their soul and conscience, in this case their beliefs, or they work in their chosen profession. One can easily understand that this is a cruel consequence which dehumanizes the individuals concerned.
[70] For many, the legislator is sending the explicit message that their faith and the way they practice it do not matter and that their faith does not carry the same dignity or require the same protection from the State. For them, Bill 21 posits that there is something fundamentally wrong or harmful with religious practices, especially some of them, and that we must protect the public. Thus, it conveys an explicitly exclusive message with regards to those who are told that they cannot participate fully in public state institutions solely because of their intimate personal convictions.
Despite these serious concerns, the court was of the view that, due to the invocation of the Notwithstanding Clause, it could not pronounce on the plaintiffs’ religious freedom / religious equality arguments under the Charter (see e.g. paras 795-800).
The plaintiffs and various interveners had also argued that Bill 21 should be struck down pursuant to jurisdictional issues, pre-Charter instruments, unwritten constitutional principles, interpretive provisions within the Charter, judicial independence, and/or the rule of law. Each of these arguments was ultimately rejected.
However, with respect to Bill 21’s ban on face coverings for elected members of the National Assembly, the Court concluded that s. 3 was violated, because this effectively prohibited certain citizens from running for elected office (paras 909-910).
The Court also considered the application of Bill 21 to Quebec’s minority language school boards – i.e. English-speaking schools. The Court noted that s. 23 of the Charter is engaged in this context (s. 23 guarantees minority language educational rights and is not subject to the Notwithstanding Clause). The English Montreal School Board argued that Bill 21 unduly interfered with their governance, and the Court agreed, noting that the Bill undermined their freedom to determine their own hiring, retention, and promotion policies:
Original judgment
[993] Dans la mesure ou une ou plusieurs commissions scolaires anglophones décident que leurs institutions d’enseignement désirent engager et promouvoir des personnes portant des signes religieux parce qu’elles considèrent que cela participe à promouvoir et à refléter la diversité culturelle de la population qu’elles desservent, l’article 23 de la Charte empêche le législateur d’obvier directement ou indirectement à un tel objectif.
[994] Sans crainte de se tromper, le Tribunal peut affirmer que le bon sens, qui fait partie de l’attirail judiciaire, permet de conclure que l’absence systématique dans un espace social de personnes auxquelles une autre, partageant les mêmes caractéristiques, peut s’identifier constitue à la fois un obstacle dans la reconnaissance sociale de la valeur de ces caractéristiques, tout autant qu’un facteur de marginalisation pour tout individu qui visa à obtenir cette reconnaissance.
Unofficial translation
[993] To the extent that one or more English-language school boards decide that their educational institutions wish to hire and promote people wearing religious symbols because they consider that this contributes to promoting and reflecting the cultural diversity of the population that they serve, section 23 of the Charter prevents the legislature from directly or indirectly obstructing such an objective.
[994] Without fear of being mistaken, the Court may affirm that common sense, which forms part of the judiciary’s arsenal, serves to conclude that the systematic absence in a social space of people to whom others, sharing the same characteristics, can identify constitutes both an obstacle to the social recognition of the value of these characteristics, as well as a marginalization factor for any individual who seeks to obtain this recognition.
Having found an interference with section 23, the Court then turned to the question of justification: could the government demonstrably justify Bill 21’s provisions as they applied to minority language schools under section 1 of the Charter? The answer, according to the Court, was “no”. Although the Court accepted that the objective of the law was pressing and substantial, the law’s deleterious effects were not proportionate to that objective. A number of the Court’s observations are worth repeating in full, especially the Court’s rejoinder to the argument that religious symbols should be “surrendered” as a condition of public employment, or that their visibility somehow undermines others’ rights:
Original judgment
[1093] Les défenseurs de la Loi 21 affirment que pour pouvoir bénéficier du privilège d’agir comme enseignant, les personnes qui arborent des signes religieux doivent laisser ceux-ci lors de leur entrée à la porte des écoles, pour les reprendre par la suite, à la sortie. Cette prétention présuppose que ces signes religieux ne constituent qu’un simple artifice qu’il convient de mettre de côté afin de respecter le principe de laïcité de l’État.
[1094] Vu de la perspective d’une personne non croyante ou de celle qui pratique une religion qui ne requiert aucune orthopraxie particulière, cette demande apparaît simple, pratique et aucunement attentatoire aux droits d’autrui. Cependant, elle méconnaît de façon fondamentale la symbiose qui existe justement entre la croyance religieuse et cette orthopraxie. L’une ne peut exister sans l’autre.
[1095] Que certains croient qu’il faille se soumettre uniquement à la loi édictée par des humains et non à celle d’un Dieu, cela demeure leur prérogative, mais tant que notre société reconnaît la liberté de religion, en l’occurrence à l’article 2a) de la Charte canadienne et l’article 3 de la Charte québécoise, il s’ensuit qu’elle ne peut en faire abstraction comme s’il s’agissait d’une simple matière accessoire. […]
[1097] Pour le Tribunal, il ne fait aucun doute que la liberté de religion et la liberté de conscience participent, à tout le moins au même caractère fondamental de l’individualité d’une personne et, par conséquent, cet énoncé et le principe juridique qu’il affirme se transposent assurément à notre affaire.
[1098] À cet égard, on peut même affirmer que les libertés de conscience et de religion, dans la mesure où celles-ci requièrent une certaine orthopraxie, comportent un aspect plus fondamental que la liberté d’expression. À titre d’exemple, on peut comprendre, en faisant un parallèle avec l’arrêt SEFPO, qu’en empêchant un fonctionnaire de porter un signe politique on viole sa liberté d’expression. Cependant, cette violation n’atteint pas l’âme ou l’essence même de cette personne, alors qu’en empêchant le port d’un signe religieux pour des personnes dont l’exercice de leur religion requiert une certaine orthopraxie, on se trouve à leur nier l’un de fondement même de leur être.
[1099] Évidemment, vu de la perspective d’une personne athée ou non croyante, cette façon d’appréhender la vie apparaît possiblement exagérée ou même irrationnelle. Cependant, chacun doit pouvoir agir selon ses convictions profondes, dans la mesure où celles-ci ne comportent pas d’effets sociaux manifestement délétères.
Unofficial translation
[1093] Defenders of Bill 21 affirm that in order to benefit from the privilege of being a teacher, those who bear religious symbols must surrender them at the school’s entrance, to then reclaim them later on, as they leave. This claim presupposes that these religious symbols are merely an accessory to be set aside in order to respect the principle of secularism of the State.
[1094] From the perspective of a non-believer or one who practices a religion that does not require any particular orthopraxy, this request seems simple, practical and in no way prejudicial to the rights of others. However, it fundamentally ignores the symbiosis that exists between religious belief and said orthopraxy. One cannot exist without the other.
[1095] While some believe it is necessary to submit only to the law enacted by humans and not to that of a God, that remains their prerogative, but as long as our society recognizes freedom of religion, in this case through section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter and section 3 of the Quebec Charter, it follows that it cannot simply dismiss this freedom as though it were a mere ancillary matter. […]
[1097] For the Court, there is no question that freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, at the very least, engage the same fundamental nature of a person's individuality and, consequently, that statement and the legal principle it affirms certainly apply to the case at hand.
[1098] In this regard, it is even fair to say that the freedoms of conscience and religion, insofar as they require a certain orthopraxy, carry a more fundamental feature than freedom of expression. For example, one can understand, drawing a parallel with the OPSEU case, that preventing a public servant from wearing a political symbol violates their freedom of expression. However, this violation does not affect the soul or the very essence of that person, whereas by preventing the wearing of a religious symbol for people whose religious observance requires a certain orthopraxy, we find ourselves denying them one of the very foundations of their being.
[1099] Obviously, from the perspective of an atheist or a non-believer, this approach to life might seem exaggerated or even irrational. However, everyone must be able to act according to their deeply held convictions, as long as these do not have clearly adverse social effects.
Ultimately, the Court concluded, the harm caused by Bill 21 outweighed any of its purported benefits in this context:
Original judgment
[1102] Il ne fait aucun doute qu’en l’espèce la négation par la Loi 21 des droits garantis par les Chartes entraîne des conséquences sévères sur les personnes visées. Non seulement ces personnes se sentent ostracisées et partiellement mises à l’écart de la fonction publique québécoise, mais en plus certaines voient leur rêve devenir impossible alors que d’autres se trouvent coincées dans leur poste sans possibilité d’avancement ou de mobilité. De plus, la Loi 21 envoie, en outre, le message aux élèves issus des minorités portant des signes religieux qu’ils doivent occuper une place différente dans la société et qu’à l’évidence la voie de l’enseignement public, au niveau préscolaire, primaire et secondaire n’existe pas pour eux.
[1103] Il s’agit là d’effets délétères très importants.
[1104] De l’autre côté, les effets bénéfiques apparaissent pour le moins ténus. En effet, bien qu’il puisse exister certaines tensions qui s’avèrent minimales au regard de la preuve[782], elles relèvent plutôt de l’épiphénomène[783] que d’une problématique qui mérite une solution législative aussi attentatoire aux droits fondamentaux. […]
[1109] Le Tribunal conclut que les défenseurs de la Loi 21 ne se déchargent pas de leur fardeau de démontrer par une démonstration convaincante, qui peut se fonder sur une preuve prépondérante, que l’interdiction du port des signes religieux participe à la neutralité de l’État dans son sens formel.
Unofficial translation
[1102] There is no doubt in this case that Bill 21’s negation of the rights guaranteed by the Charters has severe consequences for those affected. Not only do these people feel ostracized and partially excluded from the Quebec public service, but additionally some see their dream becoming impossible, while others find themselves stuck in their positions with no possibility of advancement or mobility. In addition, Bill 21 further sends the message to students from minorities wearing religious symbols that they must occupy a different place in society and that obviously the path of public education, at the preschool, primary and secondary levels is not for them.
[1103] These are indeed very serious deleterious effects.
[1104] On the other hand, the beneficial effects appear tenuous to say the least. Indeed, although there may be certain tensions which appear to be minimal in light of the evidence, they stem more from the epiphenomenon than from an issue requiring a legislative solution so detrimental to fundamental rights [references omitted]. […]
[1109] The Court concludes that the defenders of Bill 21 have not discharged their burden of establishing by a convincing demonstration, through a preponderance of evidence, that the prohibition of the wearing of religious symbols contributes to the neutrality of the State in its formal sense.
Although these comments were made in the context of assessing a violation of section 23, they are broadly-worded. And while this is purely speculative, it is hard not to think that, had the court felt at liberty to adjudicate the section 2 and 15 claims, the same reasoning would have applied, and led to a similar conclusion: that those Charter rights had also been unjustly violated for all public workers impacted by Bill 21, not just elected legislators or English school teachers. Of course, the court declined to go so far, due to the invocation of the Notwithstanding Clause.
Conclusion
Many concerns have been expressed about Bill 21: that it excludes religious identities from the public square, that it promotes an inherently anti-religious conception of secularism, that it coerces irreligious observance, that it treats religion with undue suspicion and stigmatizes minorities, and that it is antithetical to multiculturalism and religious pluralism. Those who have expressed such concerns will undoubtedly be disappointed with the decision. At the same time, though, they can also feel (somewhat) vindicated by it. Indeed, a number of significant principles find broad support in the Court’s reasons, including the following:
Awareness of another person’s religious commitments (i.e. by being “exposed” to their religious symbols) cannot, in itself, be construed as undermining anyone’s rights (paras 1045-1047, 1054, 1057).
Religious beliefs are foundational to a person’s soul, conscience, and very essence (paras 1097-1098) – forcing someone to choose between those beliefs and their chosen profession is cruel and dehumanizing (para 69).
Excluding religious citizens from public spaces sends a harmful message (paras 65, 70) and unfairly stigmatizes and marginalizes other members of those faith communities (paras 993, 994, 1102).
Religious observances – or “orthopraxies” – are inseparable from the believer’s identity; they can not simply be switched on and off (para 1093-1095); forcing a believer to do so would be to force them to deny “one of the very foundations of their being” (para 1098, unofficial translation).
Secularism – to the extent that it is advanced through the removal of religion – is not truly neutral (para 379-380); prescribing a “secular observation” is, in essence, the same as prescribing a “religious” one - “these are two poles of the same philosophical and social notion” (para 369-370, unofficial translation).
While these affirmations may be of little practical import to Quebecers of faith who remain excluded from public service, the court’s decision, in essence, sends an important message: Bill 21 is contrary to the spirit of the Charter, even though it may (in the court’s view) conform to its letter. That is no small victory for those committed to religious freedom in Canada.
The Quebec government has already announced that it intends to appeal the decision. One can expect that the plaintiffs may cross-appeal certain elements as well. The fight for religious freedom in Quebec continues.
*Special thanks to Vivian Clemence for her invaluable assistance in translating the excerpts quoted in this article